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(S. F. No. 17735. In Bank. Dec. 7, 1948.]

KATHERINE DEVENS, Appellant, v. JOSEPH
GOLDBERG, Respondent.
[1] Workmen'. Oompensation-Actions Against Uninsured Employ-ers.-In the case of a personal injury action provided· by
Lab. Code, §§ 3706-3709, for an employee covered hy the
Workmen's Compensation Act whose employer fails to secure
the payment of compensation, the negligence of the employer
is presuDl('d and the employer may not defend on the ground
that the employee was contributorily negligent or a!o:sulIlcd
the hazards attending employment or that he WIl.S injured
through the negligence of a fellow servant, whcl'!'8s in the
esse of 1\ personal injury action under Lab. Code, §~ ~SOO-~tS01,
by an employee not coveTed by the act, the burden of proof of
negligl'nce ill on the employee and the employer may, in certain
circulll~tunces, rely on contributory negligence to bllr recovery
or djmini~h the amount of damages to be awarded.

[2] Id.-ActioD:! Arainst. Uninsured Employera-Pleading.-While
there are differences between an action brought under Lab.
Code, §~ 3706-3709, and one brought under §~ 2800-2801, both
are bascd on the obligation of the employer to exercise due
care with regard to the safety of his employees, tht> sllme
facts relating to negligence will support a recovery in clLch,
and a complaint which sufficiently alleges the facts relating

[1] See 26 Oal.Jur. 263.
\
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 14;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 15; [3] Master and Servllnt, g199;
[4] Judgments, § 113(1); [5J Master and Servant, § 77; [6] Master
and Servant, § 60; [7] Master and Servant, § 171(3); [8, 10, 12]
Master and Servant, § 160; [9] Master and Servant, § 105(2);
[11] Evidence, § 1~; [13] Witneoses, § 285; [14] Master and
Servant, § 178.
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the act.

.

[3] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employee~Appeal-Hana
less Error.-In a domcstic servant's action for personal injuries, the defendant employer was not misled or prejudiced by
the allegations of the complaint referripg to his duties under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the action was tried
as one under Lab. Code, §§ 2800-2801, against an employer
not subject to the act, and where, moreover, the theory of
the trial was indicated to the employer by the denial of hia
motion for nonsuit.
[4] Judgments-Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto-Exercise of
Power.-A motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
may properly be granted only when, disregarding conHictintt
evidence and indulging in every legitimate inference wbi"h
may be drawn from plaintiff's evidencE', the result is a dlltl'r·
mination that there is no evidence sufficiently substantial to
support the verdict.
[5] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employ'ee~Duty a8 to
Places of Work.-An employer is under a duty to furnish a
safe working place for his employees.
[6] Id.-Injuries to Employee~Duty of Inspection.-The employ.
er's duty to furnish a safe working place for his employt't'l
requires him to exercise ordinary care and to make reasonably
careful inspection at reasonable intervals to learn of dangers
not apparent to the eye.
[7] Id.---Injuries to Employe~Questions of Fact.-In a domE'stic
servant's action against her employer for injuries sustained
when a porch railing gave way, it was for thc jury to determine whether a dcfective condition existed, whether a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect, and what
constitllted a reasonably adequate inspection in all the cireumstanees.
I
[8] Id.-Injuries to Employee~Evidence.-In a domestic servant's action against her employer for injuries sustaint'd when
a porch railing gave way, the evidence supported an implied
finding of the jury that the railing was defective and that a
reasonable inspection would have disclosed the defect.
[9] Id.-Injuries to Employees - Contributory Negligence. - A
domestic servant is under no duty to make an inspection of
her employer's premises to discover d(>f('cts, auri she has a
right to rely on the employer's means of knowledge and hia
duty of inquiry.

[5] See 16 Cal.Jur. 995; 35 Am.Jur. 569.
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[lOa, lOb] Id.-Injuries to Employees-Evidence.-In a domestio
servant's action ngainst her employer for injuries !\'.lstained
wh('n a porch rniling gave way, th(' .lefect in the railing was
itself !lume cvhknce of a failure in the duty to inspect; and
it ('(mId not 1)(' said as a luatter of law that the use which
defendant said It(' made of the railing constituted an adequate
inspection in the discharge of his duty as an employer, since
tJlC character and extent of the inspection required depend on
the danger anticipated and other factors.
[11] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowledge that all wooden structures are likely to get out of repair
and thnt the exercise of care is necessary to guard against
the wear and tear of usc and time.
[12] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Evidence.-In
a domestic servant's nction ngain!lt her employer for injuries
sustnined when IL porch railing gave WILY, the jury was not
required to U('copt defendant's testimony as to the nature and
extent of his nse of the railing.
[13] Witnesses-Determination of Oredibility-Motives and Interest.-In passing on the credibility of a witness and the
weight to be given his testimony, the trier of fact can consider
his interest in the result of the CAse, the manner in which h.
testified, and the contradictions appearing in the evidence.
[14] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Questions of
Fact-Proximate Oause of Injury.-In a domestic servHnt's
,"ction against her employer for injuries sustained when a
porch railing gave way, although there was no direct evidence
on the subject, it was a question for the jury whether the
defective condition of the railing was the proximate cause of
the injury, since causation may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.

)
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
, Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judgc. Reversed with directions.

!,

~":'

Action by domestic servant against employer for damages

~.; for personal injuries. Judgment for cit·f(,nchmt notwithstand-

;:, ing verdict for plaintiff, reversed with directions.

~:.

Melvin M. Belli, Henry G. Sanford, Van H. Pinney and Lou

"~

George C. Faulkner, R. Edward Burton and Wilkie C.

.~'. Ashe for Appellant.
i,- Courter for Respondent.

;:!.

GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff' hro 1 Jght this aetion for personal

i"1t_"-'

llD.iurw, ",,"'inod iu tho ,"o,w 01 ber duti", wbll. "..pluyed
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by tkfellullnt ill his home as a part-time cleaning woman. There
werl~ nn eyewitncsses to the acridl'nt, aud plaintiff, suffering
frl)l!! retrograde amnesia, was unable to rClllembcr anything
about it.'! actual occurrence. She recalled that she went into
the bathroom of defendant's home to get a rug, which she
intended to shake over the wooden guard railing on the back
porch of the house, but remembered nothing further until she
rl~gained consciousness in a hospital. She was found injured
and unconscious on the ground below the porch, and near by
were the rug and part of the railing which had broken loose
from its pORition. She has appealed from a judgment rend,ered for defendant notwithstanding a verdict in her favor.
The fiJ'l:lt ground of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was that the only cause of action stated by
the complaint was one under sections 3706-3709 of the Labor
Code and that it was barred by a complete defense pleaded
in dcftmdant's amended answer. The complaint alleged that
defendant was negligcnt. that the Industrial Accident Commission had found that plaintiff employee and defendant
employer were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
and that defendant had wilfully failed to insure. After this
action was filed, the order of the commission was annulled in
Goldberg v. Pacific Emp. In.fI. Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 472 [161
P.2d 272], which held that neither the employee nor the employer was subject to the act. These facts were pleaded in the
amended answer. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint, and
the trial proceeded apparently on the theory that defendant
WI:lS liable under sections 2800-2801 of the Labor Code in that
he ncgligently failed to maintain a safe place for her to work.
[1] By sections 3706-3709 of the Labor Code. the Legislature has provided a remedy for personal injuries for an employee covered by the act whose employer fails to secure the
pa.yment of compensation. The injured employee may sue
the employer for damages, and in such an action the negligence
of the employer is presumed. The employer may not defend
on the ground that the employee was contributorily negligent
or assumed the hazards attending employment or that he was
injured through the negligence of a fellow servant. The plaintiff may attach the property of the employer, and the action,
, being maintainable against "the legal representative of any
deeea.r.ed employer," does not abate with the employer's
death. (Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12 Cal.2d 633 [86 P.2d 826].)
An employee not covered by the act may bring an action for
dama~c.'i under sections 2800-2801 of the I.Jabor Code. in which
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action the burden of proof of negligence is on the employt'e,
and the employer may, in certain circumstances, rely on contributorynegligence to bar recovery or diminish the amount
of damages to be awarded. The action abates upon the death
of the employer. (Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 39 Cal.App.2d 273
[102 P.2d 1104].)
[2] While there are differences between an action brought
under sections 3706-3709 and one brought under seetions 28002801, both are based upon the obligation of the employer to
exercise due care with regard to the safety of his employees.
The same facts relating to negligence will support a recovery
in each, and the parties and their relationship are identical.
Although the remedies are somewhat different, the obligation
sought to be enforced is the same. If the allegations referring
to defendant's duties under the act are disregarded, the complaint states facts sufficient to support a recovery for negligence against the defendant employer, and the question is
whether the form of the pleading misled defendant to his
prejudice in presenting his defense. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 469.)
[3] It does not appear that defendant was so mislf"l or
prejudiced. The instructions indicate that the case was not
tried on the theory that defendant was liable under sections
3706-3709, but that it was tried as an action under sections
2800-2801 against an employer not subject to the act. Plaintiff was not given the benefit of the statutory presumption
of negligence which would have been applicable if the action
had been tried under sections 3706-3709, and the jury was
given an instruction on the law of contributory negligence
which was proper only if the action was within sections 28002801. Moreover, the question whether the complaint stated
only a cause of action within sections 3706-3709 was raised
by defendant upon motion for nonsv.it, and the denial of the
motion was an indication to him that the trial was proceeding
upon the theory that he was liable as an employer not subject
to the act.
[4] The second ground of defendant's motion for judg.
ment notwithstanding the verdict was that plaintiff faiIe(i'
to prove any negligence in the maintenance of the premise!!,
Such a motion may properly be granted only when, disregard.
ing conflicting evidence and indulging in every legitimattl
inference which may be drawn from plaintiff's evidence, the
result is a determination that there is no evidence SUft'\(!Vll" 11,
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substantial to support the verdict. (Heel v. Manning., Inc.,
19Cal.2d 647, 650 [122 P.2d 576].)
The back porch of defendant's home was approximately
5 feet above the ground, and there was a single wooden railing
constructed of 2" x 4" lumber 3 feet above the porch floor.
Plaintiff was 5 feet tall, weighed 105 pounds. and was not
subject to spells of fainting or dizziness. For six years she
hail been iu the habit of shaking the bathroom rug over the
railin~, anil it is clear from the evidence that this is what
she was doing when the accident occurrcd. She testified that
the only time she put her hand on the railing was when she
went downstairs and that she came in contact with the railing
about twice a week when she shook the bathroom rug over it.
She was asked whether the railing seemed to be "firmly fixed
and solin, and in place," and she replied, .. I thought flO."
A next door neighbor testified that at the time of the acci·
dl'nt she heard some moaning coming from the direction of
nl'ff'lldant's house, and on investi/lating 14ht' found plaintiff
lying unconscious on the ground below and beyond the edge
of the porch. The railing, which was lying near her, was
splintered and broken and appeared to be decayed. Anothl·r
witness testified that the railing received "hard usage" and
t.hat persons using the back porch customarily slammed the
scrt!('n door against the railing.
Df'fendant testifien that he had used the porch almost daily
for Fiov('ral years prior to the accident, that he frequently put
h~s hand on the railing while picking up milk bottles, and
that he had never noticed that it was loosc. It did not appear,
however, that he bad ever inspected the railin~ for the pur·
pose of determining its strength or soundness. The man who
repaired the porch after the accident testified that thc railing
had torn loose from the n"lils attaching it to the upright posts
on the porch and that it was not decayed. The porch and rail·
ing were subsequently replaced after this a~tion was com·
menced. All of the old lumber was destroyed and was not
available for inspection or introduction in evidence at the trial.
[5] The rule is well established that an employer is undt?r a
duty to furnish a safe working place for his employces. [6] This
duty requires the employer to exercise ordinary care and "to
make a reasonably careful inspection at reasonable intervals
to learn of dangers not apparent to the eye." (Cordler v. Kef·
,(d, 161 Cal. 475, 479 [119 P. 658] ; Fogarty v. Southern Pacific
Co .. 151 Cal. 785, 795 [91 P. 650] ; see Cra.bbe v. Mammoth
Cltan'l',el O. Min. Co., 168 Cal. 500, 503 [143 P. 714] ; RusseU T.

)
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Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527, 531 [48 P. 616] ; A..lexQ,nder v.
Central L. & M. Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410] ; Prosser,
Torts [1941] p. 507; Rest., Agency, § 503.) "The extent and
frequency of inspections depend upon the nature of the things
to be inspected, the danger to be anticipated if inspections are
not made, ... and all other factors iuvolved in the determination of the reasonableness of conduct." (Hest., Agency, § 503,
p. 1180.) The character of the work and the circumstances
of the particular case are to be considered in determining
whether the duty has been performed. (Cordler v. KefJel, 161
Cal. 475, 479 [119 P. 658] ; Fogarty v. Southern Pacific Co.,
151 Cal. 785, 796 [91 P. 650] ; Dyas v. Southern Pacific Co.,
140 Cal. 296, 308 [73 P. 972] ; Alexander v. Central L. ct M.
Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410].)
The case of Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.
St.Rcp. 56, 33 L.R.A. 747), relied upon by defendant, did
not involve an employer-employee relationship. The injured
party in that case was a business visitor, and it has been reco;!uized that "The relation of master and servant has certain
peculiarities which have given to the servant a somewhat
dHft'rent dcgree of protection than that which is given to
other classes of business visitors." (Rest., Torts, § 332, p. 901.)
What.cver may be the rule with respect to business visitors
generally, the character and extent of the duty owed by an
owner of premises to his employee is clearly settled in this
state by the decisions cited above. Furthermore, although the
Baddeley case is possibly explainable on its facts, the opinjon
contains language which is clearly out of line with latcr decisions of this court and the Restatement rule with respect to
business visitors. (See Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties,
Inc., 28 Cal.2d 394,400 [170P.2d.5] ; Hatfield v.Levy Brothers, 18 Ca1.2d 798, 806 [117 P.2d 841) ; Mondine v. Sarlin,
11 Ca1.2d 593, 597 [81 P.2d 9031 ; Rest., Torts, § 343.)
[7] It was for the jury to determine whether a defective
eonrlition existed, whether a reasonable inspection would hav~
revealed the defect, and what constituted a reasonably adequate inspection in all the circumstances. (See Neale v. Atchison etc.Ry. Co., 178 Cal. 225, 228 [172 P. 1105] ; Fogarty v.
Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 785, 796 [91 P. 650] ; Goggin v.
D. M. Osborne & Co., 115 Cal. 437, 440 [47 P. 248] ; Alexander v. Central L. ct M. Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410].)
[8] The evidence clearly supports the implied finding of the
jury that the railing was defective and that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the defect. The fact that plaintiff
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not aware of the itangerous rondition doe~ not require a
ronclusion that the defect would not have been rcveal,~d upon
a reasonable examination by defendant. [9] Plailltiff was
unuer no duty to make an inspection to discover Ilefects, anu
she had a right to rely upon her employer's means .. fkuowledge and his duty of inquiry. (See Starr v. Kreuzheryer, 129
Cal. 123, 129 [61 P. 787, 79 Am.St.Rep. 92] ; Magee v. Northern
Pac. R. R. Co., 78 Cal. 430, 437 [21 P. 114, 12 Am.St.Rep. 69] ;
Majors v. Connors, 162 Cal. 131, 135 [121 P. 371J.)
[lOa] It is urged, however, that since defendant said he
used the railing and it gave no indication of being unsound.
the evidence will not support a finding that he was negligent.
There are two answers to this contention. First, we cannot
say as a matter of law that the use which defendant testified
he made of the railing was sufficient to discharge his duty of
inspection. As we have seen, the character and extent of the
inspection required depend upon the danger to be anticipated and other factors involved. [11] It is a mat.ter of
common knowledge that all wooden structures are liable to
get out of· repair and that the exercise of care is n{'('essary
to guard against the wear and tear of use and time. (Dyas v.
Southern Pacific Co., 140 Cal. 296. 309 f73 P. 9721 ; Russell
v. Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527, 531 [48 P. 616].) [lOb] The
erection of a railing on an elevated porch is a recognition of
the danger that would be attended by a fall if it gave way.
Here we have a wooden railing which had been in plllce for
at least six years and had never been inspected for the purpose of testing its strength and safety. The defect in the
railing WAR itself some evidence of a failure in the duty to
mspect (see Rest., Agency, § 503, com. g), and the jury was
('ntitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the facts and
circumstances and base a finding of negligence thereon. In
these circumstances it was for the jury to determine whether
the use which defendant said he made of the railing' constituted an adequate inspection in the discharge of his duty as
an employer.
[12] The second answer to defendant's contention is that
the jury was not required to accept his testimony as to the
nature and extent of his use of the porch railing. [13] In passing on his credibility and the weight to be given his u'gtimony,
the trier of fact could consider his interest in the result of
the case, the manner in which he testified, and the contradictions appearing in the evidence. (See Huth v. Katz. 30 Cal.2d
605, 609 [184 P.2d 521].) Since the jury's implied finding
WAS
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that defendant was negligent is supported by th~ record, we
need not discuss the possible application of res ipsa loquitur.
[14] Defendant also contends that there was no evidence
to show that the col1apse of the railing caused the injury.
Causation may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and
whether the defective condition of the railing was the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury. (See
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Ca1.2d213 [157 P.2d 372,
158 A.L.R. 872] ; Rae v. California Equipment Co., 12 Cal.2d
563, 570 [86 P.2d 3521 ; Anderson v. Seropian, 147 Cal. 201,
216 [81 P. 521].) In the case of Bock v. Hamilton Squar,
Baptist Ckurck, 219 Cal. 284 [26 P.2d 7], a woman fell when
a porch railing collapsed. There were no eyewitnesses, and
the woman was unable to tell what occurred because she was
rendered unconscious by the fall. In answer to the contention that the evidence did not establish that the negligence
of defendant was ihe proximate cause of the accident, it was
$Ilid at page 288: "From the evidence before the court it
could be properly inferred that the injured woman leaned
against the defective railing while in the act of hanging out
the towel and that said railing gave way, thereby precipitating
her to the ground below." (See also Robertson v. Weingart,
91 Cal.App. 715 [267 P. 741].)
The judgment for defendant is reversed, and the trial
court is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff in accordancA
with the verdict.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
THAYNOU, J.-I dissel1t.
Tht> l,anse of the accident is unknown. The plaintiff does
not remember it and .cannot explain it, and there were no
eyewitnesses. The railing may have given way as plaintifl
leanea Ill!'ainst it while shaking a tug over it. She may have
tripper! before reaching the railing or fallen against it after
coming out the door. Whatever the cause of the accillent, in
my upinion there is no evidence that defendant knew of a
d~fect in the railing or would have known of it by the exercise
of reasonable care. Defendant's duty to plaintiff was to exer·
cise orllinary care to provide her with a safe place to work
&1111 perio.1ically to make reasonably careful inspections of the
premises to ascertain whether they were in a dangerous eon·
dition. (Crabbe v. Mammotk Channel G. Min. Co., 168 Cal.
500, 503 [143 P. 714] i Oordler v. Kef/el, 161 Cal. 475, 41&
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[119 P. 658] ; Uussell v. Pacific Oan 00., 116 Cal. 527. 531
[48' P. 616] ; Alexander v. Oentral L. & M. 00., 104 Cal. 532.
539 [38 P. 410] ; Prosser, Torts, 507; Rest., Agency, § 503.)
The undisputed evidence establishes that defendant performed
this duty.
Until the accident the porch and railing were in continuous
usc for a period of five or six years. Every witness who testified regarding the condition of the railing before the accident,
including the plaintiff herself-, declared that the railing
appeared to ""be firmly fixed and solid. In the light of this
undisputed evidence, df>fenrlant's daily use of the railing, in
• Plaintiff testified as follows: "Q. During the several times th"at
yon wonld go in and out of this house during that time did yon ever
"toueh that railing' A. Oh yes, no doubt.
"Q. Did you touch it every day' A. I don't reDl('mher.
"Q. Did you touch it more than once during the whole time that
you wure there' A. J went out there to do some things. I can't rf'mem"
ber. I put my hand on the railing when I went downstairs, that is
prohably the only time I would touch that railing. I would have to go
ever to tile rail if I wanted to put my hand on it.
"Q. Now. you say-what did you use that uaek poreh for-when you
W('l'(, actually doing your housework' You spoke about this rug, shaking
a mg. A. That is praetically what I would use it for-shaking my
dust mop over it.
"Q. Did you only do that onee during tbe two months that you were
there' A. No, oh, no. I did that every time I cleaned the bathroom.
"Q. How often did you elean the bathroom' A. Well, I would say
I worked there three times a week, two times n week.
"Q. And you would eome in contaet witb that railing at least two
times a week' A. Yell.
" Q. Now, during that time did you ever find anythini wrong with
that railing' A. No.
"Q. Did it ever shake with yon' A. No.
"Q. Djd you sce anything loose about itt A. No.
"Q.
it seem firmly fixed and solid, and in plaee' A. I thought so.
"Q. How man,. years out of tbat 14 years had the Goldberg! lived
at this particular house' A. Five, I think.
.
.. Q. Well, about five years I thUik. It might have been su for al\
you know, is that correctt A. I am not 'leTT good at rememhering.
"Q. Well tbat is very close. It is, you SIlY. about five years that
,.ou remember out of the-- A. (interrupting). Yes.
H Q.
Now, during that whole five years you worked for the Goldbergs,
did you notf A. Yes.
"Q. And you went in and out of this door during that five years'
A. Yes.
"Q. And you touehed this railing during your work in that five years,
did you not. A. Yes.
"Q. You eame into eontaet with it all the time.
"Mr. Belli I think that has been asked and answered'
"The witness. Yes.
"The Court. Overruled. Go ahead.

Di.

""Q.

N~w, Mr~. Devi~s, you 'say th~t it w~s ,.ou; euato~ to ab~ke th;
isthat right' A. Yes.
" Q. Will YO\1 mow the jury here just what lOU do when you 'hake

l'Ug,
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t Itl' course of which no comlitiollS nppearf'o that woul(t I('ad
a person of ordinary prudence to sllspect defects, was sufficient to discharg-e his duty of inspection. The scope of a
reasonable inspection depends on all of the circumstances
viewed in the light of the reasonably foreseeable risks in·
volved. (Rest., Torts, § 307, com. b; Rest., Agency, § 503.
com. c.) Thus regular nse constitutes a sufficient inspection
when defects would ordinarily become apparent in the course
of such use. Defects in wooden railings fall in this category.
for ordinarily there is unsteadiness in the railing that gives
warning of their existence. The majority opinion, however,
takes the view that some undisclosed type of inspection might
have prevented the accident in this ease. Neither visual inspec.
tion nor daily use that reveals no infirmity is enough. Appa·
rl'ntIy the ordinary householder is responsible for defects that
would be revealed only to a trained building inspector.
Heretofore a householder had no duty to look for latent
defects, when he had no notice of any facts that .would induce
a person of ordinary prudence to suspect their existence. Thus,
it has been held that the duty of a householder to maintain
a platform at the bottom of his front stairs in a reasonably
safe condition was discharged as a matter of law when it
appeared that defendant had no knowledge of any latcnt
defects and the everyday use of the platform gave no indication that it had become unsafe. (Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal.
1 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56,33 L.R.A. 747).} In speakin:z
of the defendant's duty to inspect this court said: "It should
be borne in mind, however, that the ultimate question of law
to be decided is whether it was the duty of the defenoant,
under the circumstances proved, to examine his platform for

the rug' A. Well, I take it-take the rug and shake it like thia
(indicating) •
"Q. Where did you go' A. Over the railing .
•• Q. And will you come up-to assume that this is your railing-will
;you come up to this railing' A. I would shake it.
• , Q. That is a little bit high. Come up to this railing down here
where it would about hit on you and show us what you do. A. I shake
it like this, shake a rug like that (indicating).
"Q. Just wiggle it a couple of timed
"A. Why I can't shake it vert hard right in front of the lady. Yee.
I would shake it vert hard if I would shake it out.
"Q. You would really shake it hard' A. Yes.
• • Q. You had done the same thing over a course of six years at the
residence of the Goldbergs, had you' A. Yes.
" Q. That same thing over this same railing' A. Yes•
•• Q. And during that time when you were shaking it vigorously as
;you have outlined did· that railing ever indicate in any way that U
was either weak or 10088' A. No."
.
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the purpose of ascertaining whether there were latent defectli
in it; for, if such was not his duty, bis omission to make
such examination was not negligence in any degree, and the
defendant was entitled to a verdict (Smith v. Whittier, 95
Cal. 279 [30 P. 529]) ; and whether or not such was his duty
depends entirely upon whether or not he had notice of facts
which would induce a man of ordinary prudence to suspect
the existence of a latent defect in consequence of which danger
of injury to person or property might be reasonably apprehended; and when, in such a case, the facts, of which one
charged with negligence had notice, are known and undisputed, the question of duty to examine for latent defects is a
pure question of law, though it may involve a question as to
the degree of care required, which is also a question of law
when the facts are given." (Baddeley v. Shea, supra, 114
Cal. 1, 7.) The scope of a reasonable inspection by a householder thus depends on what conditions if any are apparent
that would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect the
existence of latent defects. In this case not only did defendant
not know of any facts that might lead him to suspect the
existence of such a defect, but the solidity of the railing during his continuous use and the regular use by others was a
constant assurance to him that it was in a sound condition.
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion suggests
that the duty to inspect goes beyond what defendant did here.
In Orabbe v. Mammoth Ohannel O. Min. 00., 168 Cal. 500
[143 P. 714], and Alexander v. Oentral L. ~ M. 00., 104 Cal.
532 [38 P. 410], the defendants' failure to inspect was not
in issue: the defendants were ncgligent in not providing a
safe place to work at the outset. In the former case decedent
was killed by a rock falling from the roof of an I1nder~ollnd
mining st~tion. At the time of the accident the station was
not completely timbered,althoug~theneces.'1ary timber!! had
been brought to the station two weeks before the ac('ident. In
rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk :md contributory
negligence the court pointed out that it is the duty of the
employer and not the employee to inspect the premises for
dangerous conditions. In the latter case plaintiff's injury was
caused by the slipping of a board on a platform. The bonrd
rested loosely without nailing or other fastening 8S it had
for some years before the aceident. The court rejected the
defense of assumption of risk and again pointed out that the
duty of inspection rested upon the employer and not the
employee.
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In Cordler v. Keffel, 161 Cal. 475 Ill9 P. 6581, there was
no evidence of regular use by defendant of a wen-eov~riDg
over which people might walk, and it was held that the duty
to inspect was not discharged by one inspection in a period
of 11 years.
In RusseU v. Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527 [48 P. 616],
plaintiff was injured by steam diseharged into an outshle
toilet. The end of the steampipe consisted of an elbow 1';
inches long that defendant claimed extended directly downward. The place was examined after the accident, and the
elbow of the steampipe extended directly upward. Th~ steampipe had not been· inspected in any way by defendant for a
period of four years before the accident.
In Fogarty v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 785 [91 P.
650], plaintiff was injured as a result of a defective brake on
one of defendant's ears, and an examination made after the
accident indicated that the brake had not been adjusted for
some time. In violation of company rules no test of the brake
had been made immediately before the car was set in motion.
In Dyaa v. Southern Pacific Co., 140 Cal. 296 [73 P. 972],
there was evidence that the structural defects causing the
accident had caused a similar accident five years earlier and
that no repairs had been made in the interim.
In Neale v. Atchison etc. By. Co., 178 Cal. 225 {172 P.
1105], the question of the adequacy of inspection was held
to be for the jury when plaintiff introducecl evidence that
locomotives wobbled when passing over the track in question
and defendant introduced evidence showing recent inspection.
In Dawson v. Pacific Electric By. Co., 177 Cal. 26~ [170
P. 603], no inspection was made of the rope sling that brokeand caused the accident before it waS put in use.
In Bonconi v. Northwestern Pac. B. B. Co., 35 Ca1.App.
560 [170 P. 6351, it was held that a mere visual inspection
of a wooden bar used in propelling a railroad han(lcar was
not sufficient to discharge the employer's duty after a defect
had been called to the foreman's attention.
None of these cases is authority for the proposition that
the duty to inspect a porch railing is not (lischarlled as a matter
of law whE'n defendant's everyclay use of the railing indicates
that at no time Will there any weakness or shakiness therein.
The undispnted eviclence that defendant dischar~d his
duty of inspection also precludes invoking the doctrine of
res ipRa loquitul'. That doctrine applies only if it can be said
that in the light of common experience it was more likely than
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not that the accident was the res~It of defendant 'fl negli~';
genee. (LaPorte v. Houston, ante, p. 167 [199 P.2d G65].k
"Where no such balancc of probabilities in favor of negligence.
can be found, res ipsa loquitur docs not apply." (Pr~)Gscrt;
Torts, 207.) In thc presf"nt case the railing at all times"
appearcd to be firmly fixed and solid. It is thus as probable
that it gave way because of some extraordinary force or be~'
cause of somc latent defect no reasonably prudent perSOll would
have forescen as that it gave way because defendant was neg-'
'
ligent.
In my opinion the principles set forth by this court in
Baddeley v. Shea, supra, 114 Cal. 1, 5-7, nre controlling here
and compel an affirmance of the judgment.
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent '8 petition for a rehearing was denied December 30, 1948. Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted
for a rehearing.

